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INTRODUCTION 
The closing of Howard Air Force Base (AFB), Panama, in 1999, was a significant 
loss for intelligence gathering and anti-drug efforts for the United States (US).  
Operations performed from Howard AFB were vital for the US’ efforts towards its “war 
against drugs.” Temporarily the US lost its ability to conduct anti-drug surveillance 
operations in South America.  However, since then, the US has established forward 
operating locations (FOLs) in Latin America to continue its efforts in the “war on drugs” 
and the “war on terrorism.” The US identified Manta AB, Ecuador, as an alternate 
location to establish a FOL to conduct anti-drug surveillance.  Unfortunately, US FOLs 
and military bases have long been viewed unfavorably in Latin America based on past 
experiences with the US.  However, as Plan Colombia continues to be more prominent in 
the Western Hemisphere, the countries of the region are increasingly recognizing the 
need to strengthen cooperative relations with external actors and enhance their 
counterdrug and counterterrorism efforts.   
Despite this shift, ongoing tension exists between foreign policy and domestic 
politics in many Latin American countries, including Ecuador, and this tension continues 
to complicate regional security.  In 1999, the US and Ecuador ratified a ten-year 
cooperation agreement that established the Manta FOL.  US military forces perform anti-
drug surveillance operations from this FOL at Manta AB, which allows critical full air 
coverage of Peru, Colombia, and nearly all of Bolivia.1  Ecuador continues to be a 
significant asset to the US because it borders the Putumayo region of southern Colombia, 
which is considered to be the most densely cultivated area in the world for coca, the plant 
used to produce cocaine.2 Due to the geo-strategic location of Ecuador’s southern border 
along Colombia’s war zone, for over thirty years, it has been considered a transit zone 
country for drug traffickers.  This has been a growing concern for the US and the US’s 
sustained presence in this region continues to influence Ecuadorian affairs.   
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions:   
 
1 “Ecuador:  The Newest Front-Line State,” Foreign Affairs; Vol. 33, No. 26, 30 Jun 2001.  p. 1. 
2  Ibid. 
1 
What do Forward Operation Locations (FOLs) in general, and the Manta FOL in 
particular, contribute to the realization of US national security interests in Latin America? 
Given the long history of Latin American opposition to a US military presence in the 
region, what are the politics of establishing a US FOL in Latin America?   
Given the controversy surrounding the FOLs within Ecuador’s domestic politics, how 
was the Manta FOL established?  
How can the US best maintain local support for its FOLs in Latin America?   
The United States must be able to conduct operations within the region in order to 
succeed in its “war against drugs” and to combat terrorism.  When the US surrendered 
Howard AFB back to Panama in 1999 this ended a constant radar surveillance of Western 
Colombia.  After years of US hegemony, Panama opted not to renew the agreement for 
continued US presence, in its efforts to regain its sovereignty.  Howard AFB, Panama 
was considered to be a vital base for anti-drug surveillance aircraft.  Since the closure of 
Howard AFB, USSOUTHCOM has established FOLs in Aruba, Curacao, and Ecuador to 
continue its counterdrug and counterterrorism missions. Ecuador agreed to allow the US 
to develop what could become the Pentagon’s most important air base in Latin America, 
the Manta FOL, in 1999.  Manta FOL supports US surveillance operations over drug-
producing countries in the entire Andean region.  Currently, there are only a few FOLs 
established in the region but the US may consider establishing more in the future.     
Since agreement was ratified, significant Ecuadorian opposition towards the US 
presence has continued.  Several indigenous groups, more specifically the 1993 
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Pachakutik 
(Indigenous People and Democracy in Ecuador), human rights groups and the Catholic 
Church are among the main actors opposing the operation of Manta AB.3 They have led 
public rallies and arguments against the US–Ecuador cooperation agreement.  
Despite the considerable benefits provided by the U.S – Ecuador cooperation 
agreement, opposition to such collaboration persists.  According to some Ecuadorian 
                                                 
3 For more on indigenous opposition to the Manta FOL, see Pachacutik: Indigenous People and 
Democracy in Ecuador; Pachacutik/Nuevo Pais movement, a complex political organization distinct from 
CONAIE. Available at: http://www.geocities.com/aeissing/00028.html; accessed on 11 March 2003. 
2 
officials there is a difference of opinion about the true purpose or intentions of the US in 
Ecuador, and these suspicions illustrate some of the issues facing future US negotiations 
in Latin America to establish more FOLs.  In addition, during the pre and post-Panama 
era, the US and Latin America have had strained relations concerning US military forces 
within the region.   This thesis uses the case of the Manta FOL to examine the politics of 
establishing FOLs within the region and its implications for future efforts in this area. 
This thesis seeks to examine both the international and domestic politics involved 
in Latin America when establishing FOLs in the region.  It will focus on the Manta FOL 
in particular because it is essential for US strategy in Colombia and best illustrates the 
challenges of dealing with local opposition to a US military presence.  Manta AB, 
Ecuador is a key geopolitical strategic location for the US to base operations towards 
their anti-drug efforts against Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.  Due to its close proximity 
(30 minutes by air) to the Putumayo region, it is the closest and most strategic site for the 
US to maintain anti-narcotics operations.  To date, Manta FOL has been beneficial for the 
both the US and Ecuador by allowing the US to successfully gather intelligence for anti-
drug efforts, and by improving Ecuador’s economy.    
This thesis will use a political economy methodology to examine both the 
domestic and international level of Ecuadorian politics involved in the decision to 
establish and sustain the Manta FOL.  To do so, it will analyze the most relevant actors in 
the decision making process and the actors’ policy preferences and determine how they 
group themselves in this policy area and interact within Ecuador’s political institutions.4  
Secondary and open sources will be used to conduct this research.   
Chapter II describes what Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in general, and 
the Manta FOL in particular, contribute to the realization of US national security interests 
in Latin America.  The removal of troops from Howard AFB, Panama, combined with 
increasing threats from narcotrafficking and terrorism, have required a new theater 
architecture to combat these regional threats effectively.  The development of alternative 
locations, such as FOLs, within the region enables the US to continue these operations.   
                                                 
4 Frieden, Jeffry.A, and Tomz, Manuel, Modern Political Economy and Latin America Theory and 
Policy, Westview Press, 2001.  p. 37. 
3 
However, these new developments have created dissension within Latin America, which 
makes it difficult for the US to negotiate sustaining its military presence in the region and 
proposing future agreements with Latin American countries.   
Chapter III will focus on the international and domestic politics involving Manta 
FOL during the presidencies of Jamil Mahuad (1997-2000) and Gustavo Noboa (2000-
2001).  It will identify the preferences of the key actors involved in the process: the US, 
the President of the Republic, the Ecuadorian Military, the Ecuadorian Congress, and the 
indigenous movement.  President Mahuad supported the US presence at Manta AB, 
despite the growing opposition from Ecuadorian indigenous movements, because he 
believed it would contribute to the necessary ratification of a peace treaty with Peru, 
improve economic stability, and enhance governability.  President Mahuad clearly 
miscalculated: growing opposition to the accord created complications for the final 
ratification of the agreement and contributed to his removal from office.   
Chapter IV will focus on the international and domestic politics involving Manta 
FOL during the Gutierrez presidency until today, and how it will affect the future of 
Manta FOL.  The actors and their preferences continue to remain the same for the most 
part from the Mahuad through the Gutierrez administrations.  The recent election of 
President Gutierrez, who was initially opposed to the Manta accord, raised the question 
of the viability of the US FOL given his support base in the indigenous movement.   This 
chapter will illustrate how the shifting of President Gutierrez’ preferences from 
opposition to support of the FOL affects alliances among Ecuadorian political actors and 
in this case, the Manta accord.  It will also analyze how the institutional context 
influenced the change in President Gutierrez’ preferences.   
Chapter V will offer a summary of the principle conclusions and 
recommendations for future agreements between the US and Latin America that are 
similar to the case of Manta FOL.  The US must continue its efforts to improve foreign 
relations with Latin America.  Also, it must attempt to establish concise treaties and 
agreements that firmly establish the US’ purpose and intentions for the FOLs.   
 
4 
II.        AFTER PANAMA:  ESTABLISHING FOLS WITHIN LATIN 
AMERICA 
During the Cold War, the US military presence played a significant role in the 
Western Hemisphere.  Since the end of the Cold War, the US military involvement in 
Latin America has been consolidated, widely distributed and has had a significant impact 
on security in Latin America.  During the 1980s and 1990s, Howard Air Force Base 
(AFB) in Panama was vital towards the United States’ (US) efforts on its “war against 
drugs.”  However, in compliance with the 1977 Panama Canal Accords, US Southern 
Command (USSOUTHCOM) and other US military assets reluctantly vacated Panama.  
This was a significant loss for the US in terms of its efforts towards intelligence-
gathering and counternarcotics missions in Central and South America.   
In the past, the US and Latin America have had strained relations which made it 
difficult for the US to negotiate a “forward operating” or “permanent” presence for US 
military in the region.  However, the increased US interest in Plan Colombia has lent a 
new urgency to the need to negotiate US military access agreements establishing Forward 
Operating Locations (FOLs) within the region. These new locations constitute a 
decentralized presence for the US military as well as addressing regional leaders’ 
hesitations to host large US military bases.  USSOUTHCOM refers to this complex 
network of US military facilities and functions in the region as the “theater architecture.” 
These temporary facilities represent concrete commitments to underlying policy 
priorities, such as ensuring access to strategic resources, especially oil, and to a supply-
side drug war that holds source countries responsible for the US citizens’ addiction to 
illegal drugs.5 
During the 1990s, the US military presence focused on counternarcotics and 
humanitarian assistance programs within Latin America.  Its main goals were to promote 
democracy, improve economic stability, build military to military relations, and to 
combat narcotrafficking.  However, with evolving national security concerns in the 21st 
                                                 
5 Lindsay-Poland, John, “US Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Foreign Policy in 
Focus (FPIF), October 2001 [journal on-line]; Available at http://www.fpif.org; accessed on 4 June 2003. 
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century, the US missions and goals have also changed to encompass a growing US 
concern with Colombia’s drug problem and the “war on terrorism.”  This chapter 
explains how changing US national security concerns and the closure of Howard AFB, 
Panama in 1999 contributed to the need for new theater architecture after 1999.  It begins 
by discussing US security concerns and the theater architecture prior to 1999.  It then 
discusses the shift to FOLs after 1999 and shows how the FOLs in general, and the Manta 
FOL in particular, help address enhanced US security concerns in the Andean region. 
A.        USSOUTHCOM: THEATER ARCHITECTURE PRIOR TO 1999 
USSOUTHCOM’s missions and objectives in the area of responsibility (AOR) 
dictate the US military involvement in the region.  US military involvement is also 
contingent upon the theater architecture in Latin America.  Theater architecture refers to 
the permanent, semi-permanent, or forward presence in the region.  The architecture 
combined with US operations allows the US to carry out its missions.  In this section, I 
will present the missions and objectives of USSOUTHCOM during the Cold War Era and 
immediately afterward, until the closure of Howard AFB, Panama in 1999.  Next, I will 
show how the US theater architecture in Latin America during this timeframe contributed 
to military missions in the region.   
1.     Missions and Objectives 
During the Cold War Era, the primary goal of the United States was preventing 
“communist expansion” in developing democracies of the region.6    The Cold War 
military missions of “containment of Communism” and counterinsurgency have 
transitioned to a new security paradigm that provides military-security forces a leading 
role in confronting diffuse “non-state threats” in a globalized world:  drug trafficking, 
terrorism, illegal immigration, social unrest, and threats to democracy.7  Towards the end 
of the Cold War, the Andes replaced Central America as the focus of US military 
involvement in the hemisphere.8 
                                                 
6 “Latin America wary of US military expansion by IPS.”  FinalCall.com, 11 May 2003 [database on-
line]; Available at:  http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/article_758.shtml;  accessed on 15 May 2003.  
7 McSherry, J. Patrice. “Preserving Hegemony National Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era.” 
North American Congress on Latin America, Inc. NACLA Report on the Americas (1 November 2000)  
No.3, Vol. 34; pg. 26.  
6 
The US military’s relationship with Latin America was and currently is governed 
primarily by USSOUTHCOM, which is one of five unified commands.  The Department 
of Defense designated USSOUTHCOM as the lead agency for detection monitoring of 
drug traffic.  Its AOR is defined geographically and it coordinates the related programs 
and activities within the region.  USSOUTHCOM’s AOR encompasses 30 countries, (all 
the nations in Latin America and the Caribbean), excluding Mexico and Puerto Rico.9  
The waters surrounding Central and South America, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of 
Mexico and Caribbean island nations are also part of USSOUTHCOM’s responsibility.  
USSOUTHCOM is the smallest of the US’s regional commands.10  However, in 1997, 
when its AOR was expanded to include the Caribbean Sea, the organization was faced 
with two significant concerns – Haiti and Cuba.  Furthermore, in 1999, the final 
expansion of USSOUTHCOM included an additional portion of the Atlantic Ocean, this 
extended its riverine and maritime operations.11 
In the 1980s, General Paul F. Gorman, former USCINCSO12 declared 
USSOUTHCOM’s missions as follows:  1) exercise operational command over US 
Forces in South America and Central America with the exception of Mexico, 2) prepare 
strategic assessments and contingency plans and conduct training or operations, 3) 
support and assist US country team of the region, 4) monitor security programs within 
South and Central America, and 5) promote mutual security and development among 
                                                 
8 Youngers, Coletta, “Cocaine Madness; United States, Latin America, and  
Drug Policy.” North American Congress on Latin America, Inc.  NACLA Report on the Americas.  (1 
November 2000)  No.3, Vol. 34; pg. 16 
9 “Area of Responsibility.”  USSOUTHCOM Homepage [database on-line]; Available at: 
http://www.southcom.mil/pa/AOR/AOR.htm; accessed on 21 June 2003. In October 2002, 
USSOUTHCOM reorganized its AOR from 32 countries to 30 countries, with the exception of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico.   Although USSOUTHCOM components continue to operate from Puerto Rico, these are no 
longer considered part of its AOR. 
10 Evers, Stacey. “Briefing, USSOUTHCOM Adapts to Meet Divergent Role.” Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 20 August 1997, Vol. 28, Issue. 007: 19.  
11 Ibid. 
12 During the Cold War Era, the regional commanders in the military were referred to as the 
Commander-In-Chief, or CINC.  Specifically, the USCINCSO refers to the United States Commander-in-
Chief of USSOUTHCOM.  However, in the 21st century, the regional commanders are referred to as 
Combatant Commanders.   
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nations of the region.13  The main objectives of the US were as follows:  1) support for 
democracy, reform, and human rights, 2) support economic development, 3) support 
dialogue and negotiations, 4) support for security as a shield for democratization, 
development and diplomacy.14  General Gorman characterized USSOUTHCOM’s 
engagement as “low-intensity conflict,” dealing with threats to US interests within its 
region posed by those who, for political purposes, use violence in forms of coercive 
crime, sabotage, subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare.15    
The US military’s regional concerns in the 1990s focused on the drug war, 
improving interoperability, developing new missions and carrying out regional 
engagement for its own sake.  US priorities shifted based on vital threats to national 
security such as terrorism and drug trafficking.16  According to former drug czar and 
General Barry McCaffrey, former USCINCSO, “We [the US] are committed to continued 
engagement in the Latin American area.  The importance of Latin America [to the US] is 
going to grow every decade.”17  McCaffrey refers to USSOUTHCOM’s activities as 
counterdrug missions, military-to-military contact, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, and a 
tremendous array of involvement.18  In the 1990s USSOUTHCOM was involved in 
additional activities such as its participation in the Military Observer Mission, Ecuador-
Peru (MOMEP), which eventually led to an accord between both countries.  Additionally, 
US Special Forces joined with trainers from Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras to train 
platoons conducting mine-clearing operations in Honduras and Costa Rica.19  These 
activities exhibited improved military-to-military relations and assisted in peacekeeping. 
                                                 
13 General, Paul, F, “USCINCO’s Perspective, 1983-1985,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 3 
(September 1988):  308-309. 
14 Ibid, p. 310. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Isaacson, Adam, and Joy Olson, “A quick tour of US Defense and Security Relations with Latin 
America and the Caribbean,” International Policy Report – Just the Facts 2001-2002,  October 2001 p. 9  
[database on-line] Available at:  http://www.ciponline.org./facts/ipr1101.pdf; accessed on 5 August 2003. 
17 Ide, Douglas, SFC,  “USSOUTHCOM’s McCaffrey cites the Jungle Operations Training Center as 
one mission that could remain in Panama,” Update PANAMA,  
February 1996 [database on-line]; Available at: http://www.army.mil/soldiers/feb96/p18.html; accessed on 




USSOUTHCOM’s responsibilities entail patrols and providing interdiction 
support in what is known as the “transit zone” of illegal narcotics, in addition to its 
current job of monitoring cocaine, heroin and opium production in the “source zone.”20  
Two strategic initiatives in the source zone are air interdiction operations, which target 
the air movement of coca in Colombia that is key to the cocaine trade, and counter 
riverine operations in Colombia, with a parallel initiative in Peru.21  It successfully shut 
down the air bridge between Peru’s growing areas and Colombia’s processing plants.22  
The riverine efforts responded to concerns that drug traffickers would shift smuggling 
routes to the Amazon River network as a reaction to the Peruvian air interdiction 
efforts.23  Interdiction efforts between Peru and Colombia reduced coca growth in Peru 
by 18 percent, however, this led to an 18 percent increase in Colombia’s indigenous coca 
crops.24    
Throughout the 1990s, USSOUTHCOM was involved in three main types of 
exercises across the region: operational, multinational, and engineering. Operational 
exercises are mandated by the Joint Staff and cover areas such as emergency evacuation 
and counterterrorism. Multinational exercises involve humanitarian, peacekeeping, and 
counternarcotics, exercises and were an evolution of past bilateral efforts.  Engineering 
exercises involve US military engineers and host nation engineers building hospitals, 
roads, clinics and schools.  This portrays the armed forces as a “very positive force,” said 
Army Colonel Bill Knightly, former operations directorate deputy for joint training and 
exercise.25     
                                                 
20 Evers, Stacey, “Briefing, USSOUTHCOM Adapts to Meet Divergent Role,” Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 20 August 1997, Volume. 28, Issue. 007: 19. 
21 Honorable Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 
“Colombia: Counterinsurgency vs. Counter-narcotics” (speech presented at the Department of Defense, 21 
September 1999); Available at: http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/colombia99sheridan.html. 
22 Evers, Stacey, “Briefing, USSOUTHCOM Adapts to Meet Divergent Role,” Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 20 August 1997, Volume. 28, Issue. 007: 19. 
23 Honorable Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 
“Colombia: Counterinsurgency vs. Counter-narcotics” (speech presented at the Department of Defense, 21 
September 1999); Available at: http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/colombia99sheridan.html. 
24 Evers, Stacey, “Briefing, USSOUTHCOM Adapts to Meet Divergent Role,” Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, 20 August 1997, Volume. 28, Issue. 007. [Statement by USAF Colonel Bruce Cucuel, deputy 
director of the command’s counternarcotics operations]: 19. 
25 Ibid. 
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2.     Theater Architecture 
US concerns with promoting democracy, lending humanitarian aid, and fighting 
drug trafficking led to the need for its military involvement and dictated its theater 
architecture in the region.  The permanent or forward presence in the region was and 
remains to be a decisive factor for US capabilities to pursue effectively its counterdrug 
policy.   
USSOUTHCOM’s most complex operations are related to counternarcotics.  The 
command utilizes radar capabilities to assist with this mission.  Airborne units are utilized 
to cover the gaps between ground-based units.  In Panama, there were 27 separate 
defense sites operational.26  There are four ground-based TPS-43E radars that will be 
upgraded to one TPS-59 and three TPS-70s.  Additionally, USSOUTHCOM relies on 
three Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radars (ROTHR) in California, Texas and Virginia, 
as well as the Caribbean Basin Radar Network and host nation sensors.  A fourth ROTHR 
was installed in Puerto Rico.27  
In the 1990s, three bases provided the US with a “forward presence” in Latin 
America: the Enrique Soto Cano Permanent Air Base (AB) in Honduras (Soto Cano), the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Station in Cuba, and Howard AFB in Panama.   In the 1980s, 
Soto Cano AB in Honduras served as a joint command, while the US was heavily 
involved in the conflicts of El Salvador and Nicaragua.  In 1982, the Joint Task Force 
Bravo (JTF-Bravo) was established at Soto Cano AB, Honduras in order to support US 
efforts on behalf of Central American militaries and deter “Nicaraguan aggression” 
during the region’s civil wars of the 1980s.28  During the 1980s, over 2,000 US military 
personnel were stationed at Soto Cano.  In late 1988 and 1989, JTF-Bravo played a 
central role in US military efforts to help Central America recover from Hurricane Mitch.  
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It was the hub for US military Human Civic Assistance Programs (HCA) infrastructure-
rebuilding projects.29  In the 1980s, US activities in Honduras illustrated the purpose and 
nature of its response to the low intensity conflict in Central America.  This increased 
interoperability between US and Honduran forces supported President Reagan’s policy 
objectives.30  By 1995, however, a GAO report determined that although Soto Cano 
provided useful and convenient support for counternarcotics, it was no longer considered 
a critical asset for US policy objectives in the region, such as economic growth and 
democratic reform.31 
 In 1898, after the Spanish-American War, the US marines established a base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and it is considered the oldest US base outside the continental 
US.32  According to Article VII of the Treaty of 1934, Cuba continues to maintain its 
independence, while the US protects the people and the Cuban government sells or leases 
the US the lands necessary for coaling or naval stations.33   This allows the US “complete 
jurisdiction and control” of the area, while Cuba maintains its sovereignty.34  It was the 
most convenient location that allowed the US to watch one of its oldest Cold War foes, 
the Soviet Union.  The base was a strategic strongpoint for the US fight against 
communism, its harbor was ideal for refueling-retooling for US ships patrolling the 
Caribbean, and its presence deterred Nazi submarines from Caribbean waters during 
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World War II.   During the 1980s and 1990s it housed refugees and has been used for 
anti-drug smuggling operations since the 1980s.35 
In 1939, Howard AFB was established in Panama, and then in 1942, the 24th 
Wing was established as the component responsible for Air Force (AF) operations over 
Latin America and the Caribbean.36  The 310th Airlift Squadron, also known as the 
Coronet Oak, was the flying unit in the 24th wing responsible for counter-drug flights.  
Howard AFB, Panama was the center for counternarcotics detection, monitoring, 
intelligence gathering and communications during the 1980s and 1990s.  Howard AFB 
also provided the US the capability to carry out humanitarian, quick-reaction, counter-
narcotics, and search-and-rescue missions throughout the region.37 The Coronet Oak was 
responsible for airlifting cargo and transporting personnel for USSOUTHCOM.  In the 
1990s, over 2,000 counter-drug flights per year originated from Panama.38   
Furthermore, Panama was also the hub for the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 
South (JIATF-S, formerly known as the Joint Air Operations Center), which was 
established in 1992.  The military, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the US 
Customs Service and civilian intelligence personnel were integrated in the JIATF-S.  It 
planned counternarcotics operations, trained, and advised the hemisphere’s counter-drug 
forces, and monitored South America for drug-related activity.  JIATF-S also included 
military representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Venezuela.  It targeted only source zone countries where drugs were produced whereas 
JIATF- East (JIATF-E), located in Key West, Florida, focused on transit zone 
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countries.39 JIATF-E was responsible for supporting interdiction activities in the transit 
zone, primarily in the Caribbean and Central America.40  Panama provided an advantage 
in responsiveness and cost-effectiveness in the counternarcotics battle while maintaining 
regional engagement with the armed forces in the AOR for JIATF-S, a coordination and 
communication center.41 In the past, AWACS aircraft flew counternarcotics missions 
into South America from Panama.42   
In the 1980s, international narcotics trafficking was a key interest while problems existed 
with intelligence gathering for counterguerrilla warfare and countertrafficking.  In 
summary, increased US military presence in the region and improved intelligence also 
strengthened and reassured friendly nations about US commitment to their security.   
B.        USSOUTHCOM: THEATER ARCHITECTURE POST 1999  
Post 1999, the missions remained the same as during the 1990s, but with the 
addition of Plan Colombia and counterterrorism.  At the same time that its missions were 
expanding in Latin America, the US military found itself confronted with the closure of 
its main base of operations, Howard Air Force base in Panama.  The Panama Canal 
Treaty of 1977, required the US to turn over control of the canal to Panama and withdraw 
its troops by 31 December 1999, unless other arrangements were made.43  The US and 
Panama were unable to negotiate an agreement for the US to remain in Panama after 
1999.44  The removal of US forces in Panama proved to be a drastic change for the US. 
The SOCSOUTH HQ a subordinate command of USSOUTHCOM transferred to Puerto 
Rico while other USSOUTHCOM HQ and other assets were relocated to Miami, Florida, 
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and the mission of JIATF-East was expanded to include JIATF-South.45  In addition to 
this reorganization, the US would need to negotiate new bases in the AOR in order to 
maintain a forward presence. 
1.     Missions and Objectives  
Since the closure of Howard AFB, US military missions in Latin America have 
increased, particularly in Colombia.  Colombia’s situation of enduring difficult social, 
economic and security challenges has serious implications for US national security and 
humanitarian interests.46  Colombia’s situation threatens regional stability, considered 
essential to the growth and sustainment of strong democracies and free market economies 
throughout the region.47  Plan Colombia was former Colombian President Andres 
Pastrana’s response to these interrelated challenges and is part of a regional strategy to 
combat narcotrafficking and guerrillas within the region, mainly Colombia.48  Ecuador is 
an area of concern since it borders southern Colombia and targets the same economic and 
political strategies as Colombia.49  The US and Colombia have cooperated for years 
towards fighting drug cartels; however, the rebels have become more deeply involved in 
illegal drug operations, such as cultivation to transshipment and using the proceeds to 
purchase arms, bribe government officials, and commit acts of terrorism.  The US views 
threats from drugs and terrorism as two fronts in the same war.50  September 11, 2001 
marked a significant turning point for US policy toward Latin America, and Colombia in 
ombia has become a lower priority, US military aid has particular.  Even though Col                                                 
45 “Relocation of U.S. Special Operations Command-South,” Defense Link, U.S. Department of 
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50 Bender, Bryan, “Narco-Terrorism in Colombia –Visible Cracks,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 July 
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steadily increased.  In August 2002 the “2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States.” (P.L. 
107-206. Sec. 601) broadened the purpose of lethal assistance from “limited to 
counternarcotics” to include counterterrorism.51  This allowed US-aided units to combat 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army 
(ELN), and paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).52   
USSOUTHCOM’s theater strategy, derived from the President Clinton’s 2000 
National Security Strategy, was based on promoting regional security and stability among 
supporting democracies and these goals remained the same as those pursued in the 1990s, 
with the exceptions of Plan Colombia and terrorism.  Building regional cooperative 
security is accomplished by promoting activities to develop cooperative arrangements 
and confidence building measures between neighbors to reduce inter-state and regional 
tensions.53   
USSOUTHCOM and the interagency developed a three-phased counterdrug air 
interdiction plan to maximize efforts against drug smuggling aircraft in the Andean 
region.  FOLs play a key role in this plan.  Phase I is a prioritized effort to assist Partner 
Nations in developing counterdrug capabilities.  The US organizes, trains, and where 
necessary, equips the Partner Nations to conduct air, riverine, and ground operations 
against the drug traffickers.  Phase II accomplishes regional decisive operations in which 
the Partner Nations conduct a series of offensive operations to neutralize all aspects of the 
illicit drug trade by isolating drug production areas from their markets and by extending 
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police presence into the drug production areas.54  Phase III is the sustainment phase that 
allows Partner Nations to adapt to the constantly evolving drug trafficker attempts to 
outmaneuver the Partner Nations’ military and law enforcement forces.  FOLs allow the 
counterdrug assets to use source zone operational support, which is required to 
successfully employ the counterdrug campaign plan.  Additionally, critical Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions from the FOLs enhance the coupling of 
US detection and monitoring assets with partner nation interceptors.55 
2.     Theater Architecture 
The success and effectiveness of counterdrug efforts is contingent upon timely, 
accurate, predictive, and actionable intelligence.56 Unfortunately, there are deficiencies 
regarding significant ISR in the source zone that impact the timely and actionable tactical 
intelligence needed to counter diverse and mobile drug trafficking operations.57  
Additionally, the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan known as VISION 21 
transferred the responsibility for the adjacent waters above Brazil and an additional 
portion of the Atlantic Ocean to USSOUTHCOM in 1999 and 2000, placing even greater 
strains on US intelligence capabilities.58  The following paragraphs describe the positive 
changes and also the shortcomings that characterized the theater architecture after the 
closure of Howard AFB in 1999 and suggest how FOLs can remedy these deficiencies. 
Since 1999, USSOUTHCOM has continued to operate 17 radar sites, mostly in 
Peru and Colombia, each typically staffed by 35 personnel to detect smuggling flights.59  
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Information gathered from existing radar sites has been useful; however, they do not 
conduct aerial interdiction flights that allow the US to identify positively suspicious 
aircraft.  The number of Ground Based Radars (GBRs) has increased from four to seven, 
three in Peru (Iquitos, Andoas, Pucallpa) and four in Colombia (San Jose del Guaviare, 
Marandua, Leticia, and Tres Esquinas). 60   Other sites are mobilized in secret locations 
or are part of the Air Force’s Caribbean Basin Radar Network, which operates in six 
countries.  Two of these sites are Colombia’s Caribbean coast in Riohacha and the island 
of San Andres.61   The three ROTHRs that existed prior to 1999 continue to be 
operational.62 Reinforcing the growing US military contribution to Plan Colombia and to 
President Bush’s Andean Counternarcotics Initiative, radar sites and the FOLs constitute 
a cordon around Colombia.  Combined efforts from the FOLs and the radar sites that 
monitor the skies and waters of the region are fundamental for increased surveillance 
operations in Washington’s Andean drug war.63  
According to General Peter Pace, former USCINCSO, “Puerto Rico has replaced 
Panama for forward basing headquarters in the region.”64  After Panama, Roosevelt 
Roads, Puerto Rico has the highest concentration of US military forces in Latin America.  
Furthermore, the “National Defense Authorization Act” (P.L. 107-107. Section 1049) 
authorizes the termination of military training on the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico.65  It 
is now the headquarters of Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH).  Fort 
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Buchanan, Puerto Rico hosts the headquarters of the US Army South (USARSO), 
USSOUTHCOM’s army component.66  The 56th Signal Battalion, the US Army Garrison 
Command, a Military Intelligence Detachment, and a Military Intelligence Support 
Detachment were all transferred from Fort Clayton, Panama to Fort Buchanan, Puerto 
Rico.67   
The loss of Howard AFB, Panama resulted in the loss of runway access in the 
AOR.  At the time, Soto Cano, Honduras remained the US military’s only capable 
airfield in Latin America; it stills plays a key role combating drugs.68  Without AWACS 
capabilities, airtime operations would not be as effective against narcotraffickers.  If E-3 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) were forced to operate from their 
home base of Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, operations would require a tanker for air refueling 
to and from the mission.  Thus, the missions would involve three aircraft versus one, 
which would be much more costly.69  The development of FOLs resolved this problem 
by allowing AWACS capabilities to continue within the AOR. 
Today, the US continues to carry out military operations from Soto Cano AB and 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.  The US utilizes the existing Honduran military facility 
on a “semi-permanent” basis based on an agreement with the Honduran government.70  
The JTF-Bravo’s current mission is “to enhance cooperative regional security through 
forward presence and peacetime engagement operations.”71  Additionally, the US Navy 
has maintained a presence in Guantanamo Bay since 1903; it provides support for US 
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contingency operations in the Caribbean, support for counter-narcotics operations, and 
houses immigrants.  There is no termination date for the US lease on the Guantanamo 
base.  Currently, it is mostly known as the holding facility for captured Taliban and al 
Qaeda prisoners.72  These facilities augment FOL operations and maintain a semi-
permanent presence in the region vital for US capabilities. 
Partnership nation cooperation and the “will to succeed” are also crucial to the 
execution of the USSOUTHCOM strategy.  The US has generally tried to maintain close 
relationships with Latin America.  These relationships normally involve US training and 
assistance with an analysis of defense needs.  The US military has invested time to 
enhance its relationship with the militaries of the region and their relationships with one 
another, through the provision of defense articles and coordination of multinational 
training exercises.  Familiarity and contact with the region’s militaries can reduce 
tensions and contribute to a more positive military-to-military relationship and human 
security as well as alternative military roles.   As a result, it is considered imperative that 
the US maintains its presence in the region.   
C.        FOLS 
In 1999, US officials began negotiating arrangements to use existing airfields in 
Central America, the Caribbean and northern South America to base operations for 
counter-narcotics missions.  The development of FOLs was part of the international 
counter-narcotics effort agreed to by all of the presidents of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) at the Miami and Santiago summits in 1994 and 1998, and at the 
United Nations General Assembly “Special Session on Counternarcotics” held in June 
1998.   The Department of Defense established FOLs to replace counterdrug operations 
conducted from Panama.   
FOLs are usage agreements that allow US aircraft on detection and monitoring 
missions to utilize foreign airports or airbases for counternarcotics surveillance flights.73  
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These foreign facilities are owned and operated by the host country and are not 
considered US bases.  However, these installations often serve similar purposes to those 
of a US military base.   In each country, the US signed a ten-year interim agreement to 
upgrade and use the existing airfields for US personnel and equipment, in order to 
facilitate the tracking and interdiction of drugs on their way to the US.74 The US makes 
aircraft, crew, and support personnel available; these rotate in and out of the FOLs as 
necessary.  Meanwhile, small numbers of military, DEA, Coast Guard and Customs 
personnel are stationed at the FOLs to support US aircraft and coordinate 
communications and intelligence.  Negotiations concerning the agreements caused a 
certain amount of controversy; however, the civilian government in each country 
ultimately ratified the agreement.   
The FOLs are augmented by US military bases at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Soto Cano, Honduras.75  Some of the FOLs are expected to 
host F-16s fighter jets, refueling aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft for missions in the 
Caribbean, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.76  Other types of counternarcotics aircraft that 
will be utilized for counterdrug missions are the AWACs, KC-135 tanker, P-3 Orions, the 
C-130 Flowing Pen, and C-130 Furbish Breeze, image and communications intelligence 
aircraft, and Airborne Reconnaissance-Low image.77 
Four major sites were identified as FOLs:  the Reina Beatrix International Airport 
in Aruba, the Hato International Airport in Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, the Eloy 
Alfaro International Airport in Manta, Ecuador, and the International Airport in San 
Salvador, co-located with Comalapa Airbase, El Salvador.  Even though US defense 
officials have shown strong interest in the international airport at Liberia, Costa Rica, 
negotiations have not begun for an FOL agreement because it is likely to violate Costa 
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Rica’s constitution.78  It was mandatory for all of the FOLs to meet the requirements 
enumerated by Gen. Wilhelm, “Each site must be night and all weather capable with an 
air traffic control facility, an 8,000-foot runway with the capability to support small, 
medium and heavy aircraft.  Each FOL must also have refueling and crash/fire rescue 
capabilities and minimum ramp, hangar, office, maintenance, and storage space.”79  
Estimates of the funds needed to upgrade the airfields vary.  According to Coletta 
Youngers, a senior advisor from the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 
“even a minimal level of investment guarantees a long-term US presence.” 80   The FOLs 
will significantly build military-to-military ties in those locations, and allows the US to 
highlight the military’s subordinate role to democratic, civilian leadership.  
After Howard AFB, Panama, was closed Coronet Oak was transferred to two 
locations in Puerto Rico:  the Borinquen Airport in Aguadilla and the Muniz Air National 
Guard Base in Carolina. Meanwhile, other 24th wing assets moved to Puerto Rican 
airfields and FOLs in Aruba, Curacao, El Salvador and Ecuador. 81  As of May 1999, 
JIATF-S merged with Key West facilities to consolidate the task force.  Now it 
coordinates counternarcotics activities in both the source and transit zones.  According to 
former USCINCSO, General Charles Wilhelm, “We have created a single organization 
capable of ‘seeing’ from the Florida Straits into the Andean Ridge.”82  
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A “northern drug source zone” was based from Aruba and Curacao; the Andean 
region FOL was planned for Manta AB, and finally in 1999, a Central American FOL 
was established in Comalapa, El Salvador.  Since 1999, Department of Defense and 
Customs aircraft have been operating from Aruba and Curacao.  In Curacao, there are 
seven to nine aircraft, 12 to 15 permanently assigned staff personnel and approximately 
200-300 temporarily deployed operations and maintenance personnel.83  Aruba’s 
facilities are smaller, with four US customs aircraft, 15 permanently assigned personnel 
and 20 to 25 temporarily deployed personnel.84  Personnel numbers are expected to start 
out small and grow as the FOLs facilities are improved.  The Aruba-Curacao FOL 
provides effective, rapid response operation to the northern source zone, which includes 
Guajira Peninsula of Colombia and the Venezuelan border region as well as the large 
transit zones.85  The Air National Guard F-16’s, US Navy P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
(MPA), E-2 AEW, USAF E-3 AWACS conduct operations for ISR platforms.86  
In Central America, the El Salvador FOL ensures air coverage in the Eastern Pacific 
along the west coast of Mexico and Central America to focus on transit, while building 
enhanced counterdrug capabilities in the source zone.  The El Salvador FOL is operated 
by the Navy and extends for detection into the Eastern Pacific where 50 percent of illegal 
narcotics are distributed to the US.  This location has demonstrated the capability of 
operating the US Navy P-3 MPA, which contributes to its maritime counter-drug 
detection and monitoring missions.  So far, there are four P-3 MPAs dedicated to support 
and target these missions.  There are no limits on the number of US personnel who have 
access to any ports, air space, and unspecified government installations that the US 
considers pertinent concerning the El Salvador FOL.  The Front Farabundo Marti for 
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National Liberation (FMLN) argues that the agreement affects Salvadoran sovereignty, 
thus it should have required the ratification of more than a majority of a legislature.87 
D.       THE CASE OF MANTA FOL 
In 1999, Ecuador agreed to allow the US to develop what could become the 
Pentagon’s most important air base in Latin America, the Manta FOL, especially after US 
operations are shut down in Puerto Rico.  Manta FOL supports US surveillance 
operations over the drug-producing countries in the entire Andean region.  An interim 
agreement for Manta FOL was signed in April 1999, but the FOL was not operational 
until mid-June 1999 due to infrastructure improvements.88  Approximately five to eight 
US aircraft and 10-15 US support staff are allowed permanently in Manta.  These assets 
include AWACS, US Customs P-3 (AEW), and US Navy P-3s.89  A maximum of three 
medium P-3 sized aircraft and four large to medium aircraft are allowed to be operational 
from this FOL.  Although the number of temporarily assigned staff may fluctuate, it is 
expected to reach the maximum number of 475 personnel during peak periods.90  The 
case of Manta FOL is projected to be a significant asset in order for the US to carry out 
effectively its counternarcotics efforts within the region.  It offers a fundamental 
geopolitical location for anti-drug efforts against Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia because of 
its close proximity to the Putumayo region (northern border of Ecuador and southern 
border of Colombia).  This allows US aircraft accessibility to the area for surveillance 
and detection monitoring.  According to Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Manta Air Base is 
“crucial” to achieving “full [air] coverage of Peru and Colombia and nearly all of 
Bolivia.”91  Therefore, Ecuador plays a significant role in the US Andean Initiative, 
together with Colombia’s cooperative attitude towards the US policy on drug 
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trafficking.92  Intelligence gathered from FOLs and radar sites on suspicious flights are 
shared with host nation security forces, which carry out the “endgame operation.”93   
E.         IMPACT OF FOLS 
FOLs have had a positive impact on US security goals, such as counternarcotics 
activities and military-military relations.  They have also served a number of Ecuadorian 
goals.  However, opposition to the Manta FOL within Ecuador threatens democratic 
stability and calls into question the likelihood of continued Ecuador cooperation.   
The FOLs have proven to be strategically important and cost-effective for the US.  
The locations of the FOLs have given the US access to both the transit zone and source 
zone countries, which are heavily involved in drug trafficking.  Despite the ongoing fight 
against drug traffickers, the US’ efforts have steadily improved since the FOLs have been 
established.  According to Ana Maria Salazar, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, shortly after the FOLs were 
operational in their counter drug detection and monitoring missions, the interagency 
surpassed the missions that were previously flown from Howard AFB (primarily in the 
Caribbean) by 15 percent.94  Manta FOL’s location vastly improves the US source zone 
and Eastern Pacific counterdrug presence, because of aircraft access to Southern Peru, 
Bolivia, and Colombia.  Manta FOL is capable of 24 hour, 7 days a week, all-weather 
operations by AWACS Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, US Customs P-3 (AEW) 
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and US Navy P-3s.95 The interagency projected significantly greater source and transit 
zone coverage than operations from Panama once the FOLs were fully operational.96  
Concerns about the effect of the drug trade on Panama still remain.  The DoD and the 
interagency continue to monitor the country and are ready to assist Panama.  However, 
there is no counterdrug requirement for a FOL-like presence in Panama.   
To date, all facilities, and Manta in particular, have required a significant amount 
of US investments for repairs and infrastructure improvements.  The funding is included 
in the appropriation for the US’ large Colombia aid package.97  An October 2000 White 
House report to Congress indicated that the military costs to improve the FOLs totaled at 
least $137.2 million.98    While DoD reported that in September 1994, its cumulative 
treaty related cost in Panama since 1977 totaled an estimated  $813 million, an average of 
$47.8 million per year.99  The costs of the FOLs is projected be less expensive than past 
operations conducted from Howard because it is improving already existing facilities 
versus establishing a new military facility overseas. 
 Despite the opposition within Ecuador regarding the FOL, it has been beneficial 
for the province of Manta.  The US military personnel temporarily stationed at Manta 
have brought in revenues throughout the provinces, which has improved local businesses 
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and hotels.  Moreover, infrastructure improvements for the base were completed through 
US aid.100  
The opening of the FOL has also contributed to steady increases in cooperation 
between the US and Ecuador, which in turn has improved the security situation. In March 
2003, the Ecuadorian Navy deployed airplanes from its headquarters in Guayaquil to the 
Manta military base.  These aircraft will be used to control the Colombia-Ecuador border.  
General Oswaldo Jarrin, chief of the Joint Command, says the Navy and the Air Force 
will stage a joint security operation to provide domestic security against possible 
incursions by armed groups.101  The combined efforts by both the US and Ecuadorian 
militaries clearly demonstrate how the FOLs have positively impacted their relations.   
Although the US and Latin America continue to maintain military-to-military 
relations with one another, there are constituents who remain discontented with the US’ 
presence or involvement in the region.  Some Ecuadorians view the installation of US 
military bases in the Latin American region as a reflection of an increase in militarization 
of the continent.102  Although the US and Latin America’s general objective of 
combating drug trafficking provides a platform for joint efforts, the opposition sees the 
“war on drugs” as an excuse for US military presence.  At the same time, the ‘war on 
terrorism’ also became a considerable threat in the region.  Adolfo Perez Esquivel, 1980 
Nobel Peace Prize winner and head of the non-governmental Peace and Justice Service 
(SERPAJ) in Argentina, suggested that intervening in internal social affairs in various 
countries could be another US objective.  Esquivel referred to Ecuadorian President 
Lucio Gutierrez’s foreign policy as ambiguous.103  Esquival believes that if Ecuador 
becomes involved in Plan Colombia, Latin America could turn into “a new Vietnam,” 
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since allowing US troops in Ecuador will be perceived as counterinsurgency.104  It is his 
belief that Ecuador’s sovereignty will be disregarded and will be compelled into the “war 
against drugs.” Esquivel believes that these are the main arguments against the 
development of FOLs and the increased US military involvement in the region.   
The soldiers and DoD contract personnel that deploy to Latin America and the 
Caribbean outnumber personnel of US civilian agencies in the region.  According to 
critics of the United States policy, such an abundance of military personnel in the region 
potentially conveys that the US prefers force to diplomacy when settling the region’s 
problems, including conflicts with the US.  Additionally, the military base’s role to 
facilitate military operations has symbolized past US intervention and its use of local 
armies to control local populations and resources.  Although, the 10-year leases for the 
FOLs are lease agreements to monitor drug traffic, they are perceived as potentially 
damaging to a country’s sovereignty, which can generate strained relations with host 
countries.   
Increasing US military involvement in Colombia and the spillover of refugees 
from the border and conflict in the Putumayo region have caused apprehension among 
the Ecuadorian society over the destabilizing role of the Manta base.105 The democracy 
in Ecuador is under pressure from increasingly radicalized populist and indigenous 
movements.  In the past few years Ecuador has had six presidents, which indicates the 
political instability that exists within the country.106   
Ecuadorian domestic politics continues to be a concern for the US.  The last six 
years have witnessed a succession of presidents upholding widely varying opinions, as 
can be seen through Presidents Gustavo Noboa and Lucio Gutierrez.  In 1999, after 
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President Jamil Mahuad was overthrown, the former Vice President Noboa became the 
next Ecuadorian president.  President Noboa allowed the US special privileges in the 
FOL at Manta, and increased Ecuadorian military presence along the southern Colombian 
border.107  In contrast, prior to his victory in the presidential election, President Gutierrez 
participated in the revolutionary uprising of 2000 that was opposed to the Ecuadorian 
government’s willingness to aid the US in Plan Colombia.  In the beginning of his 
presidency, his support for Plan Colombia was questionable.  However, he has minimized 
his opposition to Manta FOL and in fact, he has become a supporter. 
Regional stability in Latin America remains a high priority for the US and 
USSOUTHCOM.  Improved intelligence preparation of the battlefield, better cooperation 
between the armed forces and the national police, improved air-ground coordination, and 
more effective command and control have all contributed to the effectiveness of the 
FOLs on counterinsurgency in combating narcotrafficking.   
In summary, the counterdrug FOLs are critical elements in the execution of the 
DoD’s detection and monitoring mission in support of host nation and interagency efforts 
to curb the shipment of illegal drugs to the US.  So far, the Department of Defense and 
their interagency partners have made significant progress over the past year, and with 
continued congressional support, they hope to continue in the future.108  Nevertheless, 
opposition among local constituencies remains to be a factor that could hinder further 
cooperation from potential partners.   
F.        CONCLUSION 
In the past, US interests revolved around promoting democracy, the threat of 
communism, humanitarian efforts, and narcotrafficking.  A significant change since the 
closure of Howard AFB is the centrality of the Colombian problem, which exhibits all of 
the problems the US was concerned with in the 1990s, such as drug trafficking and 
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democracy, and the new concerns of terrorism.  Through continued efforts towards joint 
military training with foreign militaries, technology assistance and other assets for 
counterdrug missions and surveillance, the US has sustained its military presence in the 
region.  After Panama, the development of FOLs was the US’ much-needed response to 
go forward with its counternarcotics missions while attempting to improve relations with 
Latin America.  The development of FOLs has also improved military-to-military 
relations and enabled Latin American countries to maintain their counterdrug efforts.   
The closure of Howard AFB, Panama led to a more diverse and widely distributed 
US military presence in the Caribbean and South America.   Although USSOUTHCOM 
has established radar sites to detect and monitor the seas and skies for drug traffickers, 
there still remains a need for a ‘forward presence’ within the region.  One officer 
describes the Manta base as “the eyes and ears of Plan Colombia.”  Although the 
establishment of the FOLs has proven to be effective for the US and Latin American 
militaries in their “war against drugs,” the FOLs have also reinvigorated opposition from 
constituencies within Latin America as the US transitions to include efforts towards the 
war on terrorism.  This illustrates the dissension that continues amongst the Ecuadorian 
populace regarding US military at Manta.   
The next chapter will focus specifically on the case of Manta FOL and the process 
of ratifying the US-Ecuador agreement involving Manta.  The use of Manta by the US 
created several points of contention within Ecuador’s internal politics, which led to 
growing instability in Ecuador’s fragile government.  The following chapters discuss the 











































III.    ECUADOR: POLITICS OF THE MANTA FOL DURING THE 
MAHUAD PRESIDENCY 
The signing of a ten-year agreement between the US and Ecuador in November 
1999 established a new Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Manta, Ecuador.  Although 
FOLs also exist in Aruba, Curacao, and El Salvador, their geographical locations do not 
permit the US to gather intelligence over the Andean region, while Manta’s FOL grants 
US operations access over the Andean region.  
However, Manta FOL remains a controversial debate within Ecuadorian politics.  
This case illustrates significant issues that must be considered when establishing a 
military presence in Latin America.   Although there is an overlap of US and Latin 
American interests, the region has not been entirely willing to provide infrastructure for 
US military operations.  Given their past experiences with the US military, Latin 
American countries are concerned with losing their sovereignty by granting the US 
access to their land for military operations.      
 This chapter examines both the overlapping interests and fears of Ecuadorian 
actors that made the Manta FOL agreement possible but controversial. The first section 
identifies the goals and preferences of the individuals and groups involved in ratifying the 
agreement. The second section describes the alliances of the groups in favor of or against 
the Manta accord.  The third section analyzes the institutional context, which can be 
understood as the institutional framework where decisions are made. The fourth section 
addresses the political outcomes, that is, how Manta FOL was established and why it 
remains a controversial issue. 
A.        ACTORS 
According to political economist Jeffry Frieden, actors in political processes can 
be assumed to be rational, utility maximizers who, “attempt to achieve whatever goals 
they have by the best means at their disposal.”109  This does not mean that they will make 
the best objective decision to achieve their goals.  They will most likely make the best 
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decisions to achieve their goals given the best information available.  Even though these 
decisions are assumed to be rational, they may be viewed as irrational because of the 
distortion derived from inaccurate or partial information.  In the situation of Manta FOL, 
the actors are assumed to maximize their economic benefits as well as address security 
concerns to a lesser extent or merely seek some improvement for the current situation for 
themselves or their group. 
In the case of the US-Ecuador lease agreement, the actors involved were the US 
government (including the Department of State and Department of Defense), President 
Jamil Mahuad, the Ecuadorian Congress, the Ecuadorian Military, and social 
organizations (Indigenous groups, Church).110  I have categorized the actors into two 
groups based on their interests towards the US presence in Ecuador. The two groups that 
formed were those in favor of the FOL and those opposed to it.  The former consisted of 
the US, the Mahuad administration, and the Ecuadorian Military.  The Ecuadorian 
congress and civil society organizations were mostly opposed to the Manta agreement, 
although there were some who favored the US presence.   
In the first group, actors shared the general objectives of fighting against drug 
traffickers in a cost-effective manner and improving bilateral relations.  The US 
recognized the need for alternative locations within the region to continue its 
counternarcotics efforts, and Manta FOL was projected to be the most vital of the three 
FOLs.  According to General Barry R. McCaffrey, former White House drug control 
policy director, “from a geo-strategic standpoint, we’re going to be better off than we 
ever were in Panama.  These new operations offer us the opportunity for far greater 
coverage than we’ve ever had in the region.”111  Manta’s close proximity to source 
countries allows overall coverage of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, which was a feature 
that Panama did not offer.  At the same time, conducting operations from the FOLs is 
more cost-effective for the US.  According to Steve Lucas, former spokesman for 
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USSOUTHCOM, the estimated total cost of infrastructure improvements at all four FOLs 
will be $116 million, with yearly maintenance at an estimated $14 million.112 In 2001, 
the annual base operating expenses for the Manta FOL were estimated at $7.4 million and 
these costs would increase in the following years.113   In comparison, the US spent $78.5 
million on operations from Panama in 1999.114   Although the agreement did not require 
the US to pay rent for the use of Manta AB, it did agree to refurbish the base’s 
infrastructure.  These improvements would allow AWACS and P-3 Orions to operate 
from Manta as well as enable direct flights for commercial aircraft.   
As part of his economic reform agenda, President Mahuad proposed Manta AB as 
a future US FOL.  President Mahuad’s objectives were to remain in office, stimulate 
economic reform, and improve governance.  He sought to improve Ecuador’s economic 
situation through increased US aid and protection for its threatened borders.  President 
Mahuad expected an accord for foreign debt as a payback in exchange for allowing the 
US to use Manta.115  President Mahuad could save funding on security issues and invest 
it towards other interests. The improved runway would also allow direct commercial 
flights thus facilitating Ecuadorian exports from its port while using US military forces as 
a deterrent along its borders.  Mahuad believed the FOL would allow him to achieve both 
his monetary and security objectives.   
In the past, the Ecuadorian Armed Forces (FAE) and the US military forces have 
engaged in joint military exercises to train against and combat narco-threats, which has 
led to an improved militarized cooperation between both countries.  Moreover, 
intelligence collected by an increasing number of US military operations would improve 
the potential for counternarcotics cooperation between the US and Ecuador.116 
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Information generated from Manta-based monitoring flights would greatly enhance the 
detection and interdiction of illegal drugs in the region.  Although not documented, the 
FAE have limited funding due to the country’s economic instability and US operations 
would be beneficial for the FAE in its fight against illegal activities and security 
concerns.   
Since President Mahuad signed the peace accord with Peru, the main border 
problem along the northern border was guerrilla infiltration and the drug trade.  US 
operations from Manta would assist with these problems and the US would also provide 
aid to modernize the base. But the Ecuadorian government and its Armed Forces would 
control the military operations from the base, which protects the country’s sovereignty.117   
Therefore, the Ecuadorian Congress’ Foreign Affairs Committee and President Mahuad 
approved the US-Ecuador agreement for Manta AB.  This document clarified that the 
cooperation between the US and Ecuador was aimed at the employment of aerial 
operations for detection, observation, tracking, and control of illicit drug trade that 
“compromises the sovereignty and dignity of the country.”118 Furthermore, Mahuad 
affirmed that the US would not interfere with internal affairs incumbent upon the 
Ecuadorian government.119  Moreover, the US counternarcotics policy stated that, 
“Ecuador seeks to strengthen the technical capability of Ecuadorian police, military, and 
justice sector agencies to attack the narcotics trafficking problem in Ecuador, including 
improved border and port control, investigation and prosecution of narcotics trafficking 
organizations, and reduction of domestic drug consumption.” 120  Due to Ecuador’s 
economic instability this was the most effective way to achieve its goals since it was not 
receiving sufficient funds to improve its massive debt.  Although the FAE have increased 
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border security, unfortunately they lack the capabilities to conduct counter drug 
surveillance missions.  However, having a US force presence permits critical data 
collection as well as increased forces along the border.  The improved runway will also 
help exports of main industries, such as shrimp and tuna, which would be beneficial for 
its economy.  For instance, Gwen Clair, the former US ambassador to Ecuador advised 
the improvements of the landing strip would foment interest among foreign airlines in the 
use of the terminal, and thus improve the Manta area's tourism and commercial 
sectors.121  
Although the actors in favor of Manta FOL wanted to achieve the most 
economically beneficial and security oriented goals, their interpretations were not always 
the same. The US counternarcotics policy in Ecuador focused on strengthening the 
technical capability of Ecuadorian police, military and justice sector agencies to attack 
the narcotics trafficking problem in Ecuador.  Focused on its interests in the region, the 
US also wanted a base for cost-efficient operations in the coca-producing countries of 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Meanwhile, President Mahuad was concerned with staying 
in office, improving Ecuador’s economic instability through US aid as well as addressing 
external threats.  He assumed the US would concede to an accord on the foreign debt as a 
payback.122 At the same time, the Ecuadorian military was concerned with the possible 
implications resulting from US operations.  Even though US military assistance would be 
a significant asset for its fight against drug traffickers and guerillas, there were some 
military officers who opposed the US presence.  According to Col. Jorge Brito, one of 
Ecuador's chief military strategists, the base was part of the “regionalization” of the 
Colombian conflict and was closely tied to Plan Colombia.123  Other concerns were the 
military implications of the agreement, because the base would serve as “the eyes and 
                                                 
121 Lucas, Kintto, “POLITICS-ECUADOR: Military Base Feeds Threat of Involvement in War.” 
Available at: http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/nov00/19_39_063.htm; accessed on 4 June 2003. 
122 Rohter, Larry, “As US Military Settles In, Some in Ecuador Have Doubts.” New York Times, 31 
December 2000 [database on-line]; Available at www.tni.org/drugs/document/nyt3112000.htm; accessed 
on 7 June 2003.  
123 Lucas, Kintto,  “POLITICS-ECUADOR: Military Base Feeds Threat of Involvement in War.” 
Available at: http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/nov00/19_39_063.htm; accessed on 4 June 2003. 
35 
ears of Plan Colombia.”124  This regionalization could provoke further threats or attacks 
from guerillas that targeted those assisting Plan Colombia.   
By contrast, after dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy, the indigenous groups 
feared that establishing a FOL would further US intervention.  They were concerned that 
the US military presence would threaten their sovereignty.  Some believed that the US 
had ulterior motives for using Manta, which could include a staging area for a “bigger 
plan” that consisted of more permanent operations and possibly targeting terrorist 
organizations in addition to drug traffickers.125 Additionally, some thought this situation 
would invite intervention, rather than negotiation in a crisis.  Ecuadorian Congressman 
Henry Llanes stated that, “we are compromising our neutrality in the Colombian conflict 
with Manta base, dragging ourselves into a war between the Americans and their enemies 
in Colombia.”126  On the other hand, military commanders thought that the spillover 
effect from drug traffickers and guerrillas was inevitable whether the US was present or 
not due to Ecuador’s close proximity to Colombia.127  Colonel Jose Bohorquez, 
commander of the air base said that, “it was a result of the geography and the situation in 
Colombia, not of the American presence, and we should be clear about that.”128 Even Lt. 
Colonel Edison Sanchez, who would eventually support an indigenous uprising against 
Mahuad’s government advised, ''Ecuador was already involved in a conflict that was 
becoming regional.''129  
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Gilberto Talahua, president of the Committee on Indigenous Affairs in parliament 
said, “the accord was signed in violation of constitutional norms and without citizen 
discussion or participation.”130  Ecuador’s Congress never approved the agreement, as 
required by the Constitution and it was therefore, deemed unconstitutional and created 
strong opposition towards the US.131 Additionally, the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), numerous social and non-governmental 
organizations, and several political parties, filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court, 
claiming the agreement was unconstitutional. 132  In Manta’s case, the President believed 
that Congress’ approval was not required to ratify the agreement.  As a result, 
Congressional representatives assumed that the agreement was ratified under false 
pretenses and thus violated the Constitution.  Because both the US and Ecuador 
governments circumvented Congress’ approval authority, this soured relations.133  
As a result the Ecuadorian Congress considered the “convenio”134 
unconstitutional until further review.  Despite the unusual absence of Congress’ role, 
eventually the document was deemed constitutional. (Section C, below, provides an 
extended discussion of the constitutionality issue.)  Opposition continued – for some 
Congressional members because they did not want the American presence, and for others 
it was a way to assert a role for Congress in the political process.  Antonio Posso, an 
influential leftist member of Congress insisted that, “this base is a provocation to all of 
the irregular forces in Colombia.”135 So far the Colombian guerrillas have attacked the 
oil pipeline, while paramilitary groups have killed people on Ecuadorian territory, and 
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some Ecuadorians are afraid that the military installation could be viewed as another 
possible target for terrorists attacks.136  The reason for some Congressional 
representatives’ hostility towards the accord was to make a political statement against the 
Presidency.   This issue eventually contributed to the environment that led to a coup 
d’etat.   
One point of contention was that US military bases represented a commitment of 
resources in the region, displacing assistance for civil society and social programs.  In 
addition, US military installations have been characterized by a lack of transparency and 
accountability.137 For instance, bases in Puerto Rico distort islanders’ choices about 
political status, while training in Vieques represents an extreme of undemocratic 
policy.138 
Overseas bases similar to Manta have presented problems for environmental 
cleanup that has been interpreted as an abuse to the host country’s human rights.139 From 
the Latin American perspective, once Washington no longer has interests in a region, the 
US normally abandons both jurisdiction and responsibility for the contamination its 
military has caused.140  This has contributed to the pessimism about the FOL. 
B.        ALLIANCES 
Although President Mahuad was able to ratify a peace treaty with Peru, he failed 
to improve the economic situation and the indigenous people held an uprising against the 
administration.  Some of factors that weakened his political support were adopting a 
dollarized economy, proposing Manta AB as an FOL, and the increasing financial crisis. 
In the beginning of 2000, the indigenous movement declared their intention to force the 
exit of the three powers141 of the State. In the beginning, the military supported the 
administration, but later they demonstrated their support for the march to oust President 
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Mahuad.  This shift in support created confusion within Congress and the administration.  
The leader of the mid-level officers who had joined the indigenous uprising, Colonel 
Lucio Gutierrez, disavowed the President of the Republic, the National Congress, and the 
Supreme Court.  He replaced them with a Sovereign Civic and Military Junta consisting 
of a triumvirate:  Antonio Vargas, President of the CONAIE, Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, 
and Carlos Solorzano (Ex-president of the Supreme Court).142  “The only certainty is that 
there is a tacit pact between the indigenous people and the colonels:  if the movement 
advances and achieves a blockade of the three powers’ seat, then officers will support 
them.”143  In order to maintain unity of the armed forces, Colonel Gutierrez ceded his 
place in the Triumvirate, which allowed the interim President Noboa to succeed former 
President Mahuad.  In the end, there was a lack of oversight in the judicial branch, 
military support was lost, and the actors remained in the same groups. 
C.        INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
The Ecuadorian Constitution prescribes a complex process of ratification of 
international agreements.  Article 171, number 13 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, defines 
the President of the Republic’s duties as follows: He is allowed to define foreign policy, 
to direct international relations, to celebrate and to ratify treaties and international 
treaties, previous approval of the National Congress, when the Constitution demands it.  
His duty is to protect Ecuador’s national sovereignty by defending the integrity and 
independence of the State.144  He is committed to send, to modify, or to countermand 
some laws.145  Most importantly, Article 162 clarifies that the approval of treaties and 
agreements, will occur in a single debate in Congress and the agreement must be 
approved by a majority of Congress.146  Furthermore, Article 161, Number 2 plainly 
                                                 
142 Paladines Comacho, Carlos, Eduardo, “Civil Military Operations in Ecuador” (Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 39. 
143 Paladines Comacho, Carlos, Eduardo, “Civil Military Operations in Ecuador” (Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 39. 
144 Constitucion Politica de Ecuador, 1998. Article 171, Number 13.   Available at:  
http://georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Ecuador.ecuador.html; accessed on 19 June 2003.  
145 Ibid.  
146 Ibid.  
39 
states that Congress is entrusted with the approval of or withdrawal from international 
treaties and agreements.147   
Previously, with respect to the conformity of the Constitution a treaty or 
agreement required the opinion of the Constitutional Court.  Also, since Congress did not 
review the agreement initially some opposers argued that the Constitutional Court should 
intervene.    A treaty or agreement that demands a constitutional reform must be sent to 
the Constitutional Court prior to approval.148  Heinz Moeller, former Chairman of the 
Ecuadorian Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that the agreement did fall under Article 
161 of the Ecuadorian Constitution because the article refers to matters of national 
territory or borders.149  Since this agreement did not compromise either of those, the 
agreement did not require Congress’ approval.  
At the same time, Nina Pacari, who led the indigenous political party Pachakutik 
was selected as the second vice president of the 1998 Congress.150  Described as one the 
main opponents to the US military presence, her appointment demonstrated that the 
indigenous population was beginning to establish a significant force in politics.  
Consequently, this would lead to more problems in attaining Congress’ approval for the 
agreement. 
Moreover, Article 163 ensures that the norms contained in treaties and 
international treaties, once promulgated in the Official Registry, will comprise the legal 
ordering of the Republic and will prevail over laws and other norms of smaller 
hierarchy.151  Congress believed the international agreement required Congressional 
approval even though President Mahuad did not treat this international agreement as a 
law.  Congress believed he had violated this rule, which caused further dissension 
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amongst the public.  Religious leader Elsie Monge, president of the Ecumenical 
Commission on Human Rights, argued that the need for Congressional approval applied 
to those agreements that “establish political or military alliances, which occurs in this 
case.”152  Therefore, although the President is one of the main actors involved, Congress’ 
approval must also be present.   
Historically, opposition forces in Congress have been loosely organized and they 
often unite to block the administration’s initiatives and remove cabinet members.153  The 
constitution of 1998 strengthened the executive branch by eliminating mid-term 
congressional elections, but sustained Congress’ power to challenge cabinet ministers.154  
By drawing up a convenio, instead of a treaty, the President and the Executive branch 
sought to remain in control and avoid the need for Congressional approval.  The 
President knew the difficulty and opposition he would face from Congress if he had 
attempted to ratify a treaty.  A treaty entails a more complex and intertwined process, 
which requires Congress’ final approval and less authority to the President and the 
Executive Branch.  Thus, ratifying a convenio appeared to be a simpler process for the 
President to undertake. 
D.        POLICY OUTCOMES   
President Mahuad and current foreign minister Heinz Moeller, then president of 
the International Affairs Committee in the Ecuadorian Congress, signed the agreement 
despite the controversial debate surrounding this issue.155  Congress had no control or 
participation in the negotiation process of the agreement.  This document granted the use 
of the base to the US armed forces.  Although it was not brought before the full Congress 
or public opinion until after it was signed, the Noboa government has upheld the 
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document's validity.  The establishment of Manta FOL has significantly increased the 
potential for counternarcotics cooperation between the US and Ecuador.156 
Since the Presidency considered the document between the two governments an 
agreement and not a treaty, the government thought viable to go forward with the project 
without a vote in Congress.157  At the time, Mahuad’s popularity had decreased to 14 
percent of voter support, the lowest in the country’s history.158  He felt he needed to seize 
any opportunity for US aid to improve the economy, even in the form of the controversial 
Manta agreement.159  However, some Congress members believed the agreement needed 
further review.  The approval was contingent upon whether or not Congress considered 
the conditions to be beneficial to the Ecuadorian nation.160  Until then, the agreement was 
regarded as unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, Congress had not approved the bilateral 
agreement concerning Manta before President Mahuad ratified the agreement. After the 
agreement was signed both by Ecuador and the US, the Ecuadorian Congress conducted 
another review of the document.  After the coup, Congress reviewed the agreement and 
deemed it more economically beneficial for Ecuador therefore it deemed the agreement 
constitutional.   
Though finalized under unusual circumstances, the agreement was considered 
valid by the President, Executive branch, Foreign Ministers, and eventually the 
Ecuadorian Congress.  Despite the relative strength of some actors who could have 
overturned the decision, this was not the case.  Exceptions to the rules within the 
institution delegated by the Constitution allowed the agreement between the US and 
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Ecuador to be legally approved. When Gustavo Noboa assumed the presidency after 
Mahuad’s removal from office, the country’s economic and political instability was 
evident.   A US proposal to boost its $70 million in aid to offset the dangers caused by 
Plan Colombia greatly facilitated President Noboa’s efforts to implement the Manta 
agreement.161  Congress could have demonstrated a more stubborn opposition and 
refused to allow the US to establish the FOL.  However, this would have also been 
potentially detrimental for Ecuador’s economy. This would have forced the US to rely on 
operations from the three other existing FOLs to compensate for missions from Manta.  
Although this would not have been in the US’ best interests, the US would continue to 
maintain its focus on its counterdrug policy to combat narcotraffickers.  While 
maintaining strong bilateral relationships throughout the AOR, we promote regional 
cooperation and transparent operations among all our regional partners.162 
In sum, some political bargaining made it possible to approve the agreement and 
declare it constitutional.  Nevertheless the ambiguity of the interpretations regarding the 
legal framework opened the door for Mahuad’s opposition to capitalize on his political 
miscalculations leading to the coup.   
E.        CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the President’s preferences drove the ratification of the accord 
forward regardless of opposition from other actors with conflicting preferences because 
of the institutional framework.  The institutional setting constrained him because he was 
faced with a controversial issue, while he was in a politically weak position.  The 
ambiguity in the institutional framework, and changing political balance were key factors 
that caused controversy during the negotiation process of the agreement.  Nevertheless, 
the power shifts, the institutional changes, the changing preferences, and the distribution 
of power were all determinants that eventually led to ratifying the document.  At the time, 
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President Mahuad’s popularity had fallen drastically to 14 percent of voter support, and 
he was placed in a precarious position.163  His oppressors were determined to remove 
him from office due to his inability to improve the economy. Stabilizing the economy and 
removing the foreign debt were not feasible at the time, but he still attempted to establish 
this agreement to improve the situation.  As a result, President Mahuad wanted to seize 
any aid from the US, which included the collaboration in operating Manta with the US, 
under the pretext of combating drug trafficking.164  Although, he was aware of the 
opposition he would receive toward the agreement, he continued to negotiate with the 
US.  Therefore, he proceeded through the threshold to ratify a sustainable agreement 
despite the potential ramifications it would have on his term of office.    
In spite of the obstacles that the Republic of Ecuador and the US government 
were confronted with concerning the ten-year lease agreement, it still remains 
constitutional today.  However, after examining policy foundations for military bases in 
the region, the US should review existing agreements for overseas bases using 
democratic criteria.  The Congress modified its position on the US – Ecuador agreement, 
which allowed the document to remain constitutional.   
In the case of Manta FOL, if the Ecuadorian President had initially consulted both 
Congress and the public prior to the agreement, this may have prevented much of the 
controversy during the negotiation process.  The US must consider how the domestic 
politics of a country could affect the future of US military operations within Latin 
America.  The Congressional decision to soften its position against Manta FOL and deem 
it constitutional was an exception to the Constitutional law.  Therefore, in the future the 
US should not attempt to establish military access or employ controversial military 
missions through private means, such as the outsourcing of military operations, without 
approval from the host government and its constituents. The decision was validated 
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according to the Ecuadorian Constitution that determined the framework, which allowed 
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IV.  POLITICS OF THE MANTA FOL DURING THE GUTIERREZ 
PRESIDENCY  
The 2000 coup represented a break in the democratic process in Ecuadorian 
politics as well as a turning point for US-Ecuador relations.  Lucio Gutierrez, the ex-
colonel in the Ecuadorian Armed Forces (FAE) who had led the 2000 coup d’etat against 
President Mahuad in part out of opposition to the Manta AB agreement, was elected 
President of Ecuador in the 2002 elections. Surprisingly, despite Gutierrez’ election and 
continuing tensions in US-Ecuador relations over Manta AB and other rising areas of 
concern, the maintenance of Manta AB does not seem to be threatened. 
In this chapter, I will address why Manta remains viable despite the changes in 
administrations, policy preferences, and alliances.  First, I will analyze why Gutierrez 
changed his position on the Manta AB. Next, I will describe how this change has affected 
the alliances since the implementation of the Manta FOL agreement.  The actors and 
institutional context remain unchanged for the presidencies of Mahuad and Gutierrez, 
with the exception of presidential administrations.  Finally, I will discuss why Manta 
FOL continues to remain viable.  The basic assumption during this analysis is that the 
changing international and domestic political influences have impacted the actors’ 
preferences while the institutional framework remains unchanged.   
A.        ACTORS 
In the beginning of Gutierrez’s presidency, the US and the Ecuadorian Military 
were firm supporters of the maintenance of the US FOL at Manta AB.  In contrast, the 
Gutierrez administration, Congress and the social organizations opposed the FOL.165 
Subsequently, President Gutierrez’s change of heart has had a significant effect on the 
politics of the Manta FOL. 
Prior to and in the beginning of Gutierrez’s presidency, a number of leftist 
organizations supported the former colonel, most notably the Popular Democratic 
Movement (MPD), which is the electoral front of the Ecuadorian Communist Party 
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(Marxist-Leninist).  The CONIAIE, the National Confederation of Peasant, and the 
Indigenous and Black Organizations all backed Gutierrez as well.166   The CONAIE and 
the Social Movements Coordinating Board (CMS) are comprised of the following:  
ECUARUNARI (Confederation of Peoples of the Kichwa Nationality of Ecuador) which 
represents the indigenous communities of the Sierra region, CONAICE (Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities from the Ecuadorian Coast) which represents those of the coast 
region, and the CONFENAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities from the 
Ecuadorian Amazon Region) which represents the Amazon indigenous communities.167   
B.        GUTIERREZ’S PREFERENCES  
Since his inauguration, President Gutierrez has shifted towards the right, with his 
neoliberal economic reform policies and his support of Manta causing him to lose support 
from part of the indigenous movement.  This loss of support altered the alliance of the 
government and now President Gutierrez has aligned himself with other parties.  
Gutierrez’s supporters prior to and in the beginning of his presidency were comprised 
mainly of the indigenous peoples.  The indigenous peoples retained their preferences and 
expected the administration to fulfill its promises to them, but President Gutierrez had 
failed to fulfill his promises, which caused them to turn against him.   
In 2000, President Gutierrez led a group of disgruntled junior officers and 5,000 
Indian protestors that forced out President Jamil Mahuad, a highly unpopular president 
suspected of corruption.  Later, when the armed forces acceded to US demands to step 
down and allow former vice-president Gustavo Noboa to take office, the indigenous 
people considered those military members as betrayers and unsupportive of the coup.    
President Gustavo Noboa, successor to Mahuad, supported free-markets, willingly aided 
Plan Colombia, and allowed the US privileges at Manta FOL.168 President Gutierrez and 
the indigenous groups were displeased with the former administration for several reasons, 
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including the unilateral decision of both the armed forces and the Mahuad administration 
to comply with US demands on occupying Manta AB.  But once in office, President 
Gutierrez, one of the main actors, changed his preferences on several fronts, which have 
affected the configuration of the alliance.  The coup demonstrated the frailty of Ecuador’s 
fragile government.  The indigenous peoples and those who supported his election are 
concerned that their goals are not given any priority during his presidential term.   These 
political changes can also potentially affect the future of the Manta accord and even the 
presidency itself.   
1.     Prior to and the Beginning of Gutierrez’ Presidency 
During his electoral campaign, Lucio Gutierrez offered a left of center political 
platform that advocated using the armed forces for public works, renegotiating the Manta 
Base accord, and taking radical action against corruption.169 Gutierrez and his supporters 
believed that US operations from Manta AB negatively affected the country’s 
sovereignty and autonomy.  President Gutierrez and his supporters in civil society, such 
as the CONAIE, and more specifically, the Pachakutik, the political arm of the national 
indigenous federation, and the Church joined together and opposed the US – Ecuador 
convenio.  In 2001, the Patriotic Socialists’ Party (SP) and indigenous groups, in 
particular the Pachakutik, played a significant role in Gutierrez’s win during the first 
round of elections.  They declared President Gutierrez as their presidential candidate and 
saw Gutierrez as a legitimate representative of their interests.  They considered 
themselves direct partners in his bid for the leadership of the country.  Furthermore, the 
social organizations assumed that Gutierrez supported their aspirations of a growing 
presence in the political realm and a new role in the societal hierarchy.  He named two 
indigenous members as part of his cabinet, which demonstrated his support for the 
indigenous groups.  Luis Macas became the new minister of agriculture, while Nina 
Pacari was appointed as the new Foreign Relations minister.  Both were members of 
                                                 
169 Program Summary: Quito Radio Quito Spanish 2200 GMT 14 Jul 03. FBIS, 14 July 2003.  
Document ID: LAP20030714000098.  Available at:  https://portal.rccb.osis.gov/servlet; accessed on 18 
August 2003. 
49 
CONAIE, the indigenous organization that participated in the protests of 2001.170  
However, he also appointed Ivonne Baki to his cabinet, who has been referred to as a 
friend of former President Bill Clinton and was an advisor to former President Jamil 
Mahuad.171  
A key advisor to Gutierrez was General Rene Vargas Pazzos, the former head of 
Ecuadorian forces and former professor of Gutierrez who was also involved in the coup.  
He described Manta AB as a scar on Ecuador and believed that it would be used for 
covert and gray activities by the US military and Dyncorp.172 When it was reported that 
the US wanted to add more operational aircraft at Manta AB to augment its capabilities 
against drug trafficking in South America,173 General Vargas pointed out that Manta is 
large enough to host the largest US troop carrier airplanes, C-5 Galaxy, C-130 and C-140 
--  speculating that the base could be used as a staging area for a major invasion instead 
of drug interdiction.  General Vargas advised Gutierrez during the bargaining process, 
and emphasized that the President should ensure that the base is used strictly for anti-drug 
surveillance operations and prevent any further base expansions.174  Former military 
officers and former ambassador accuse the accord of violating national sovereignty and 
as being unconstitutional.175 
During his electoral campaign, Gutierrez raised concerns among some 
Ecuadorians, since he was supported by a small Marxist party, radical Indian groups and 
leftist-led unions.  Gutierrez felt, “leftists support him because they share the same 
objectives to fight corruption, poverty, social injustice, and impunity, which will allow 
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the indigenous people to achieve better lives.”176  In October 2002, Gutierrez signed a 
political pact with Pachakutik, confirming his and his party’s agreement to work together 
with Pachakutik toward similar goals.177  The agreement included the concerns of 
CONAIE and Pachakutik in regards to the social costs of IMF-oriented economic policy.  
Pachakutik has questioned the necessity of negotiating with the IMF and insisted on the 
reconsideration of the US-Ecuador treaty for use of the Manta Air Base.  Additionally, 
the Pachakutik and CONAIE platform pressured the Ecuadorian government to request 
the Colombian government to terminate all fumigations within a specified number of 
miles from the Ecuadorian border.  CONAIE has taken a general stand against Plan 
Colombia and US policy.178   Gutierrez’ preferences reflected those of the indigenous 
groups, and granted him the support of a diverse coalition of social movements and the 
Socialists Party.  However, since taking office, Gutierrez toned down his rhetoric and 
shifted toward the center, describing himself as “center-left.”179   
2.     During Gutierrez’ Presidency to Present Day 
During his presidency, President Gutierrez demonstrated a shift in his preferences 
towards support for the Manta FOL, which created opposition from the indigenous 
groups that had initially supported him in his presidency.  President Gutierrez was 
inexperienced in the political arena, which put him at a disadvantage when he first 
assumed the Presidency.  He entered into agreements with local indigenous movements 
without realizing the international and domestic factors affecting his policies as President.  
Likewise, Gutierrez’s leadership became a key element for the development of Ecuador’s 
relationship with the U.S. government, which at this point is cautiously making positive 
statements regarding Gutierrez’s administration.  Gutierrez also took a big risk by 
reaching out to the Social Christian Party (PSC) once he took office because the 
indigenous movements that supported him viewed this as negatively affecting their 
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interests.180  Gutierrez’s overtures to the PSC have become more sensitive after a series 
of political struggles between this party and some indigenous movements.   
Aside from facing domestic pressures within Ecuador, Gutierrez also faced 
international pressures from the US.  In the beginning, the US viewed Gutierrez’s 
surprising victory in the 2002 presidential elections with skepticism since the change in 
administrations could have been potentially detrimental to the continued US presence at 
Manta AB.  After a diplomatic visit to the United States, Gutierrez began to exhibit signs 
of backing down on some of the policies he advocated during his campaign.  This was 
perceived as a further betrayal to the constituents that put him in power.181  When he 
eventually approved the continued presence of America’s military base in Manta, 
indigenous peoples believed this undermined Ecuador’s sovereignty, but also implicated 
Ecuador as an ally in America’s drug war.182  In the past, the US has been accused of 
diplomatic extortion by using US assistance as an incentive to change national polices or 
as a means of circumventing national procedures to achieve a desired outcome.183  This 
external influence was illustrated when after several visits to the US, President Gutierrez 
softened his opposition towards the US on a number of issues, in particular the US 
military’s use of Ecuador’s Manta AB.  President Gutierrez also began to distance 
himself from the leftist presidents who have recently come to power in Venezuela and 
Brazil.184 Taken together, these actions by President Gutierrez reveal a significant shift in 
preferences towards the U.S. and its presence in Ecuador.  
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C.        ALLIANCES 
Although the presidency has changed hands -- from Mahuad to Noboa and now 
Gutierrez -- the groupings remain largely the same over Manta.  Once Lucio Gutierrez 
became president, his policy preference shifted into alignment with that of his two 
predecessors, Mahuad and Noboa. This led to growing tension between the President and 
his former supporters and has resulted in a breakdown of the alliance.  Specifically, the 
civil society groups hostile to the Manta FOL are dissatisfied with the President’s 
administration and have turned against him.   
1.     Turning Point: The Tide Turns   
Members of the social and indigenous movements who were supportive of 
Gutierrez before and after the coup now proclaim that he has not abided by his promises 
to them.  According to Mario Canessa, Government Minister, Ecuador has undergone an 
economic turnaround causing widespread dissension towards the administration.  He adds 
that this widespread dissatisfaction with the Gutierrez administration can be accredited to 
the government's tough policies.185  These opposing groups claim that he has betrayed 
them by creating a neoliberal administration.186  Gutierrez continues to use the FAE for 
border security and other security concerns.  He has also become a supporter for the 
Manta accord and continues to maintain close ties with the US.  Additionally, the Anti-
Corruption Commission said that the Gutierrez administration has failed to provide 
evidence to support its claims for fighting corruption.187   
Francisco Huerta, Noboa’s former Interior Minister and advisor to the 
Government Minister, pointed out that the government must consult with all sectors and 
not only the political organizations that initially supported it because the latter are no 
longer the mediators between the society and the State.188   He added the Government 
Ministry must be informed on foreign relations issues since “almost all the domestic 
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agenda is external: the conflict at the border with Colombia, immigration, import tax 
protections…”. The adviser asserted that the Indigenous population represents only 10 
percent of the total population.189  He added that although their aspirations are legitimate, 
they cannot be imposed. Huerta warned that if oil prices fall or if Mr. Bush stops being 
President Lucio Gutierrez' best ally these factors could possibly destabilize the 
government.190   
2.     The Breakup of the Alliance  
A significant segment of the Ecuadorian indigenous community has declared 
President Gutierrez a “traitor” and has now decided to join the opposition to his 
government.  They view him as a traitor to himself and to the people of Ecuador because 
President Gutierrez underlined that this has become a right-wing government and 
appointed representatives of right-wing parties to manage the economy and politics.191  
Despite this, some indigenous groups continue to support the government. 
Leonidas Iza, head of CONAIE denied that there was a division within the 
movement, and affirmed that since several social organizations have joined CONAIE, 
they are more united and stronger.192  Leonidas Iza stated on behalf of the CONAIE that 
they oppose privatization, increases in gas prices, taxes, and anything that goes against 
the economic interests of the people.  In contrast, Umberto Cholango, president of the 
organization that represents the indigenous communities of the Sierra region, 
ECUARUNARI, declared that indigenous leaders supporting President Lucio Gutierrez 
do not belong to the CONAIE. Regardless, the representatives of the Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE), one of the three 
organizations that make up CONAIE, has given its support to the government and 
accused the CONAIE leaders of being “elitist and oligarchs.”  The president of CONAIE 
dismissed the incident, arguing that the group is simply concerned with employment in 
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the government.193  Deputy Salvador Quishpe explained that in Congress, the Pachakutik 
bloc is divided into two groups: one of five deputies, including himself, are in favor of 
the administration’s policies; the other group, of six deputies, thinks the alliance should 
be broken.  Quishpe added that one of his colleague’s behavior is “inconsistent.” At first, 
Posso, the leader of the opposing group had originally pushed for the alliance with the 
government-aligned Socialists’ Party.  At the same time, however, he stressed that the 
movement must “fulfill our duty to the people,” suggesting a position critical of the 
government.194   
D.        OUTCOME 
On 6 August 2003, the Indigenous leaders officially announced the breakup of the 
alliance with the government.  After receiving criticism from several members of the 
Pachakutik Movement, Gutierrez himself ended the alliance with the indigenous peoples 
and their political arm.195  President Lucio Gutierrez warned the Pachakutik deputies that 
if they voted against the SP in Congress, “they must leave the government.”196  In a 
speech Gutierrez said, “to Deputies Antonio Posso, Ricardo Ulcuango, Angel Garcia, and 
two others whose names escape me: either you vote tomorrow in Congress with the 
government, with this administration's policy for change, or you leave the alliance.”197   
On 15 August 2003, the leaders of CONAIE discussed a three-point agenda: 
evaluating the break-up of their alliance with the government; discussing the country’s 
current situation; and defining their position regarding the government. Of these 
organizations, only the Peasant Social Security has withdrawn its support for the 
president. The CONAIE and the Social Movements Coordinating Board (CMS) have not 
yet declared their position.  Furthermore, CONAIE itself has also split: ECUARUNARI 
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(Confederation of Peoples of the Kichwa Nationality of Ecuador) representing the 
indigenous communities of the Sierra region, and CONAICE (Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities from the Ecuadorian Coast) representing those of the coast 
region, who want to leave the alliance while, the CONFENAIE (Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities from the Ecuadorian Amazon Region) represents the Amazon 
indigenous communities, who want to remain.198   
The Democratic People’s Movement (MPD) and Popular Democracy Party (DP) 
have also called for a US withdrawal from Manta Base.199  Since the Patriotic Society 
[SP] aligned with the Social Christian Party [PSC] and condemned the conspiratorial 
behavior of a former president, the other center-left parties want to demonize it. President 
Gutierrez pointed out that the center-left parties themselves voted with the PSC to elect 
legislative and electoral officials and the PSC has the plurality of deputies in Congress.   
The indigenous groups claim that they have enough power to overturn the 
government if they oppose its policies and administration.   Antonio Vargas, the 
CONAIE President said that, the toppling of the Mahuad government by a civilian-
military force could be emulated in any country in Latin America if the people unite.200  
He argues that if all social sectors united and held the majority over the political parties 
then the government would be unable to resist.201   Vargas speculates in the future 
important steps will be taken in the fight for identity, beginning with the Chiapas, in 
Mexico, and in Ecuador, where the Indian people, with the backing of the rest of civil 
society and the military “attempted to establish a solidarity government.”202 He added 
that throughout the region the “dictatorship of the politicians” is in danger due to the lack 
of structural changes and the imposition of the international financial institutions that is 
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detrimental to the poor.203  On 19 August 2003, the government and PSC legislators 
blocked the indigenous groups’ efforts to create a new center-left majority coalition in 
Congress.   Socialist Deputy Segundo Serrano said that the government had “meddled” in 
the negotiations, by offering government positions to Roldosist and PRIAN deputies if 
they break away from the alliance with Pachakutik.204   
President Lucio Gutierrez admitted that he is now obliged to seek agreements 
with the traditional political parties that he once described as corrupt to keep the country's 
unstable economy on track after losing the support of the indigenous movement.205  
Furthermore, he invited the independent indigenous leaders to a march on 22 August, 
which was organized by the SP in support of the administration.206  They expressed their 
support for the administration and rejected statements made by CONAIE.207   
Given his need for support, and in the light of the new political scenario, 
Gutierrez said he would negotiate with those parties that are beyond the left or right wing 
and concerned with the good of the country.208   
E.        VIABILITY OF MANTA:  FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
Since the government’s coalition with the CONAIE and the Pachakutik has 
ended, it appears that the Manta FOL will continue to operate unimpeded, and Ecuador 
will continue to abide by the agreement.  However, new issues of contention have arisen 
between the US and Ecuador.  Recently, the US request to the Ecuadorian government to 
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sign an agreement exempting US citizens from the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has become a major locus of contention.  Congress president 
Guillermo Landazuri disagrees with the US position with regards to the ICC.209   He 
believes that crimes affecting human life must be punished anywhere in the world, 
without exception.210   Moreover, Deputy Carlos Vallejo, chairman of the International 
Affairs Committee, said that, “if Ecuador is offended by a unilateral US action then the 
Manta Base agreement should also be revised.”211  Former Foreign Minister Nina Pacari 
rejected such an option, saying that, “Ecuador has granted concessions to the United 
States by allowing it to use Manta Base, and will continue to comply with international 
law.”212   
Although the agreement has been sustained, other controversial debates between 
the US and Ecuador exist and will continue to exist in the future, including the issues 
surrounding the signing of Article 98 in reference to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  Although this issue does not concern ratifying the Manta FOL, Ecuadorian 
opposition once again begun to raise the issue of the unconstitutionality of the Manta 
accord and US involvement in Ecuador.  US Ambassador Kristie Kenney said the 
Ecuadorian and US Governments will continue to discuss US citizens’ immunity from 
the ICC, thereby avoiding the suspension of US military aid.  The US Embassy in Quito 
issued a communiqué urging Ecuador to sign the agreement on the ICC issue.  Former 
Foreign Minister Julio Prado claims that Ecuador should refuse to sign the agreement, 
and also renegotiate the Manta Base accord.213  Additionally, Carlos Vallejo, president of 
the Congress International Affairs Committee, said that, “if the US withdraws its military 
aid from Ecuador, then it should also withdraw from Manta Base.” He considers the US’s 
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ultimatum an offense to Ecuador; he believes the country should act with dignity and 
refuse to kneel to it.  Lieutenant Colonel Leonidas Enriquez, commander of the 23rd 
Combat Unit, downplayed the controversy by asserting that few concessions have been 
made to the US at Manta.  He stated that Ecuador controls all operations from the base 
and only authorized unarmed US airplanes are allowed to operate from it.214    
Deputy Guillermo Gutierrez, President Gutierrez's brother, said that while he is 
concerned about the US position, he sees no reason why it should affect the Manta Base 
agreement.  He indicated that Ecuador sticks to its agreements.215  Former Defense 
Minister, Jose Gallardo, warned that, “the withdrawal of US military aid would affect 
Ecuador's ability to control its Colombian border and the US Government has wrongly 
tried to impose its will by relating US citizens’ immunity to regional security.”216  He 
believes that it is in Ecuador’s best interest to gain control of its Colombian border 
without US aid.217  After these developments, some indigenous and grass roots 
movements have organized nationwide demonstrations to begin 21 August 2003 to 
protest the government's alleged move to the right and failure to fulfill campaign 
promises.218 
F.        CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the President’s failure to follow through with his campaign 
promises to the social organizations has caused dissension within the government.  At 
first, President Gutierrez appeared to be in support of the indigenous groups’ priorities.  
However, during his presidency he has demonstrated a shift in preferences, which ended 
the alliance between the Gutierrez administration and a sector of the indigenous group, 
the Pachakutik.   
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Furthermore, the relationship between the US and Ecuador continues to be 
unstable, even tense on several fronts.  The appointed US ambassador to Ecuador, Kristie 
Kenney, will face the prospects of a more complex relationship as regional dynamics, 
such as Plan Colombia, the implementation of US anti-narcotic policies and regional 
treaties on trade, become intertwined with the newly developing global realities of the 
war on terrorism and troubled world markets.219 In spite of these developments the 
Manta accord appears to remain viable in the future.    
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V.        CONCLUSION 
The negotiation and ratification processes to establish the Manta FOL along with 
ongoing concerns of U.S. military presence have already been discussed, therefore this 
chapter will briefly summarize the internal politics of Ecuador involved in establishing 
the Manta FOL and then extrapolate from them to assess the concerns with establishing 
future forward operating locations in Latin America.  The feasibility of future FOLs in 
the region will be critically analyzed by considering the politics involved with the Manta 
FOL, which demonstrates universal concerns about the U.S. military presence in Latin 
America.  Finally, this chapter will conclude with some conclusions and 
recommendations for future academic and policy work on this subject. 
U.S. military missions in the new millennium continue to require a forward 
presence in Latin America as Chapter II pointed out.  In the 1990s, the 
USSOUTHCOM’s missions were aimed at promoting democracy, assisting in 
humanitarian efforts, developing military to military relations, and combating the threat 
of narcotrafficking.  An important change in the security environment since 1999 is the 
escalating problem in Colombia, which encompasses previous US concerns in the region 
as well as the new emphasis on countering terrorism.  USSOUTHCOM has adapted its 
missions to effectively respond to these vital interests combined with the increasing 
hostile situation in Colombia and the focus has recently shifted towards the “war on 
drugs” and the “war on terrorism” due to the changing political and security environment.  
Through persistent efforts towards joint military training with foreign militaries, 
technology assistance and other assets for counterdrug missions and surveillance, the US 
has continued its military presence in the region.  Moreover, the closure of Howard AFB 
led to a more diverse presence to encompass more of Latin America and the Caribbean.   
The development of a  “forward presence” or FOLs was the US’ response to advance its 
counterdrug operations while seeking to improve relations with Latin America.   The 
FOLs have improved military-to-military relations and proved to be a more cost-effective 
method to conduct counternarcotics operations in the Western Hemisphere than 
traditional basing arrangements.  Furthermore, with the projected closure of Vieques, 
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Puerto Rico the Manta FOL will become the most vital asset for US military operations 
in the Western Hemisphere.   
The establishment of the FOLs has proven to be valuable for the US and Latin 
American militaries in their “war against drugs,” but the FOLs have also stimulated 
opposition from constituencies within Latin America.  President Mahuad’s political 
strategy allowed the ratification of the accord regardless of the opposition from social 
organizations, the indigenous groups and the Church in particular, to the US military at 
Manta AB, but his attempt to bypass political debate carried a risk for the stability of his 
government.    The ambiguous institutional framework and instability in the political 
system were key factors that generated controversy during the negotiation process of the 
agreement.  The opposition was determined to remove him office for several reasons, but 
mainly because he failed to improve the economy and signed the US-Ecuador agreement 
for Manta AB.   
Establishing the Manta FOL without consulting the Ecuadorian Congress was in 
violation of Ecuador’s Constitution, and therefore, the U.S. exacerbated opposition to its 
military presence.  This violation raised questions about the constitutionality of the 
agreement, caused difficulties during the ratification process, and contributed to the 
removal of President Mahuad from office.  The past three Ecuadorian Presidents 
considered the agreement to be constitutional, which permitted it to be viable thus far.  
However, this issue remains controversial among local constituents who insist on 
renegotiating the agreement, which could lead to its abandonment.  Although the 
Ecuadorian Congress eventually ratified the agreement, this diminished but did not 
eliminate popular challenges to its constitutionality. As a result, Ecuador and the US 
government were confronted with a number of obstacles in attempting to establish the 
ten-year lease agreement for the Manta FOL.  President Mahuad’s failure to abide by the 
Ecuadorian constitution by signing the Manta accord means that the Manta FOL could 
always be under threat of revision due to the unstable conditions of the Ecuadorian 
government.  The local population remains afraid that the US has ulterior motives for its 
counternarcotics military operations from Manta AB to include the possibility of 
counterinsurgency efforts in Colombia.  The U.S. is forced to deal with these issues of 
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contention because they could potentially affect the renewal of the agreement.  This 
suggests that the US should take into account the democratic process when reviewing 
existing agreements for overseas bases.  In the case of establishing the Manta FOL, if the 
Ecuadorian President had initially consulted both Congress and the public prior to the 
agreement, this could have eliminated much of the controversy that accompanied the 
negotiation process.  Furthermore, the US must take into account the domestic politics of 
a country that could affect the future of US military operations within Latin America.  
The Congressional decision to mitigate its position against the Manta FOL agreement 
was an exception to the provisions of the Ecuadorian constitution.   
President Gutierrez’s behavior during his administration illustrates how US 
diplomacy can encourage a shift in executive preferences, which in turn can minimize 
dangers to US FOLs in Latin America.  The indigenous movement’s support was largely 
responsible for President Gutierrez’s successful election, which could have potentially 
jeopardized the Manta FOL’s future.  Prior to his presidency President Gutierrez made an 
agreement with the indigenous movement to improve several concerns with Ecuador’s 
government; the renegotiation of the Manta accord was one of these main issues.  When 
President Gutierrez came into office he shifted his preferences on several of these issues, 
including becoming a supporter of the Manta accord.  Although President Gutierrez’s 
shift was positive for the US, it contributed to a weakening of his political support base.  
The US must be sensitive to Gutierrez’s precarious position when making additional 
demands on his government, such as the ultimatum to sign the accord exempting US 
citizens from the jurisdiction from the jurisdiction of the ICC.   This demand, and the 
threat of cutting off US aid, has newly jeopardized the future viability of the Manta FOL.     
The US and the Mahuad administration used a politically exclusive decision-
making process when establishing the Manta FOL.  This was a risky approach for both 
the US and Ecuador, which almost resulted in a breakdown of the democratic process in 
Ecuador.   To avoid issues similar to this in the future the United States must ensure that 
during future negotiations of FOLs, it is adequately informed about governmental 
procedures and abides by them.  Therefore, if the US attempts to establish military access 
or employ controversial military missions, it must consult with the host government and 
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its domestic constituents for final approval as well as abiding by the host nation’s 
constitutional law.  Fragility in Latin American governments and their democracies poses 
a challenge for continued acceptance of US FOLs and the US must be prepared to 
renegotiate its military presence in the region through subsequent Presidents and 
continued opposition from domestic constituents in Latin America.   
The case of the Manta FOL illustrates how significant the influence of local 
indigenous groups has proven to be in Ecuador.  The indigenous groups’ main opposition 
to the Manta accord is shaped largely by their exclusion from the political ratification 
process.  Political representation remains and will continue to be a concern for Latin 
America because the local populace is afraid that they will not be involved in the debate 
over future U.S. presence in the region.  Some Ecuadorians are concerned that by 
supporting U.S. military operations from Manta FOL, they will be become a target for 
future terrorist attacks and drawn into Colombia’s civil war.   
This thesis has presented the international and domestic politics involved with 
establishing the Manta FOL and the challenges of dealing with opposition to a US 
military presence.   A number of recommendations are in order for the US to avoid 
further difficulties when establishing FOL agreements in the future.  First, the US should 
consult with the civil societies and legislatures from the host nation for approval prior to 
establishing a base in Latin America.220  This will ensure transparency and accountability 
to host countries.  Next, the 10-year lease agreements should be amended to authorize the 
public health and environmental officials of host nations and representatives of the 
communities to inspect the U.S. FOLs and other similar facilities.221  This will allow the 
host nation government and Armed Forces to maintain control and oversee that military 
operations are properly conducted from the FOL.  Furthermore, the US should include 
domestic constituents of the host nation, such as representatives from the indigenous 
groups, in the negotiation process.  This will grant the constituents political 
                                                 
220 Lindsay-Poland, John, “U.S. Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean/” Foreign Policy 
in Focus| (FPIF), October 2001 [journal on-line]; Available at: 
http://www.americaspolicy.org/briefs/2001/body_v6n35milbase.html; accessed on 18 June 2003. 
221 Ibid. 
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representation on the international level and the opportunity to present their concerns 
regarding the US military presence.  
This will all require a combined effort from both the US and Latin American 
governments.  The US will continue efforts to ease domestic opposition and attempt to 
gain more domestic support within Ecuador.  When the terms of the 10-year lease 
agreement are up for renegotiation, these will contribute to the US’ intention to sustain its 
presence at Manta AB.  Although ongoing concerns about the US military presence will 
exist throughout Latin America, the US must continue with its efforts to diminish this 
opposition and prove that its military presence is beneficial for both the US and Latin 
America.  The US and Ecuador will continue to engage in a complex relationship as 
regional dynamics, such as Plan Colombia, the implementation of US counternarcotics 
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